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Some 18,000 workers at AT&T’s wireless division (formerly Cingular) have organized with
CWA since 2005, including these retail store workers in Ohio. Nationwide, more than 40,000
workers at the company have organized with CWA under the union’s neutrality and card check
agreement.
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STRATEGIES FOR REVITALIZING THE LABOR MOVEMENT
NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENTS
Innovative, Controversial, and
Labor’s Hope for the Future
OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS THERE HAS BEEN A NOTABLE SHIFT IN UNION ORGANIZING
strategies. Once the exception, organizing conducted under the umbrella of
negotiated neutrality agreements has become the preferred method in the drive
to reverse decline and build union density. This approach allows unions to avoid
A shorter version of this paper appears as “The Origins, Effectiveness and Future of Neutrality Agreements,” in
Perspectives on Work, Fall 2007. Portions of that paper are replicated here with the permission of the editor.
the pitfalls of traditional organizing conducted
under the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) framework, which enables employers’
aggressive resistance to unionization. Typically,
management’s anti-union campaigns include
mandatory captive audience meetings where
the employer condemns the union, one-on-one
meetings with supervisors where workers are
grilled regarding their union sentiments, fir-
ing of selected active union supporters, and le-
gal delays. Instead, if unions are able to secure
a binding commitment from the employer to
remain neutral, organizing is relatively straight-
forward and in most cases the union is able to
win majority support and bargaining rights.
Pursuit of employer neutrality and the
closely associated card check route to certifi-
cation, where the union is recognized with a
majority of workers signing union cards, are
not confined to the realm of actual organizing
campaigns. Proposed changes in labor law to
endorse this approach have elevated neutrality
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to the top of organized labor’s list of political
priorities. The spread of neutrality agreements
and labor’s strong push to amend the law have
been spurred by notable cases of organizing
success. But this success has invited
scrutiny, and attacks from the Right and
the Left. For example, legitimate ques-
tions have been raised about the top-
down nature of some specific Service
Employees International Union (SEIU)
neutrality agreements. A careful look at
the criticisms aimed at SEIU raises more
general questions about the wisdom of
those neutrality-based organizing cam-
paigns that neither engage workers in
struggle nor build union solidarity.
In spite of the criticisms, there can
be little doubt that labor’s campaigns to achieve
and enforce neutrality agreements offer hope
that the long-term decline in union density ac-
tually can be reversed. A high-profile example
of a strategic blend of bargaining and organiz-
ing demonstrates the potential of this approach.
HOTEL WORKERS RISING:
BUILDING LEVERAGE TO
SECURE NEUTRALITY
IN 2006, UNITE-HERE’S HOTEL WORKERSRising (HWR) campaign drew the public’s
attention to the health and safety concerns of
housekeepers, kitchen workers, and other “back
of the house” employees in first-class hotels op-
erated by Hyatt, Hilton, Intercontinental,
Marriott, and Starwood. The union’s report,
Creating Luxury, Enduring Pain, highlighted the
trend toward larger beds and multiple oversized
pillows and its association with a notable rise
in work-related injuries among members of the
housekeeping staff. To make its case, UNITE-
HERE used the employers’ own Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) re-
ports, which revealed an annual workplace in-
jury rate of 10.4 percent for housekeepers
(Moriarty, 2007: 8). Based on the data, the
union publicly exhorted the major hotel chains
to agree to changes in work practices, such as
increasing the time allotted to clean a room and
having housekeepers work in pairs to handle
oversized mattresses.
The plight of hotel housekeepers and the
HWR campaign became national news because
the union had succeeded in securing summer
2006 contract expirations in seven major cit-
ies: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Fran-
cisco, Boston, Toronto, and Honolulu. The
nearly common expiration dates, which had
been an objective of union bargaining for
several years, were secured through a series of
contract fights in individual cities. In several
cities the union insisted on shorter contracts
(with member support), and in San Francisco
members endured a lockout and two years of
working without a contract (Sherwyn et. al.,
2006). UNITE-HERE’s objective in establish-
ing the 2006 expiration dates was to gain greater
leverage in negotiations, which would help it
Labor’s campaigns to
achieve and enforce
neutrality agreements offer
hope that the long-term
decline in union density
actually can be reversed.
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address workplace concerns such as the health
and safety issues. But the foundation of the bar-
gaining strategy was to go beyond wages, ben-
efits, and working conditions and develop
leverage that would increase the potential
to achieve another high priority: employer
agreement to organizing neutrality. The plan
succeeded.
In city after city without a strike, UNITE-
HERE contracts were resolved on terms that
met the union’s economic and workplace goals;
even more important to UNITE-HERE’s own
institutional health, organizing neutrality was
established as the standard in the industry. Both
Hilton and Starwood reached national agree-
ments that assured neutrality in luxury and
convention hotels in specified markets. In ad-
dition, several municipal hotel associations
agreed to neutrality language covering both
new properties and some existing hotels
(Sherwyn et al., 2006). UNITE-HERE estimates
that it has added almost 6,000 new members
under the agreements (Raynor, 2006).
The 2006 hotel campaign epitomizes the
contemporary union practice of bargaining to
organize. As was the case with HWR,
unions often use a comprehensive stra-
tegic approach that includes research,
publicity, mobilization, and various
forms of leverage to secure key bargain-
ing objectives that address the concerns
of current members and facilitate new or-
ganizing (Moberg, 2006). In particular,
the neutrality agreements secured by
UNITE-HERE are by no means unique,
but reflect the established consensus that
employer commitments to forsake standard
union avoidance techniques are essential to
organizing success. In order to assess both the
viability of these contemporary methods and
the validity of lingering criticism, it is impor-
tant to step back and look at the recent evolu-
tion of organizing strategy and at the prospects
for legislated changes and future growth.
THE EVOLUTION OF UNION
ORGANIZING
AS BOTH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SCHOLARS ANDlabor journalists have demonstrated in re-
cent articles, the contemporary paradigm for
union organizing in the United States combines
employer neutrality and card check recognition
(see Moberg, 2006, and Becker et al., 2006).
This represents a dramatic shift from the stan-
dard NLRB-based organizing framework that
prevailed from the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act in 1947 until at least the late 1980s.
During that era, most unions were content to
recruit new members and attempt to add new
bargaining units under the umbrella of the
orderly NLRB representation election proce-
dures. This style actually fit the dominant ser-
vicing model of unionism: organizers “sold the
union” based on the services it delivered and
the contractual improvements it could prom-
ise, and were content to let workers decide by
secret ballot whether they wanted to collectively
“purchase” the benefits associated with union
representation.
Legitimate questions have
been raised about the top-
down nature of some
specific SEIU neutrality
agreements.
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Labor’s embrace of the NLRB framework
loosened during the 1980s in the face of mem-
bership decline and plummeting private sector
union density. By the early 1990s, a new con-
sensus had emerged in the form of what was
referred to as “an organizing model of union-
ism.” The idea was that as flawed as the NLRB
election procedures were, unions could over-
come their disadvantage with a grassroots
model of organizing rooted in building the
union rather than selling the union. As argued
by prominent advocates of this approach,
[D]espite the intensity of employer oppo-
sition, what unions do during organizing
campaigns is what matters most. . . . [T]he
use of a grassroots, rank-and-file-intensive
union building strategy is fundamental in
significantly raising the probability of win-
ning (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998:
33).
Throughout the 1990s, many unions ag-
gressively pursued grassroots organizing. But
in spite of some notable successes, union den-
sity continued to decline in the private sector.
There were two basic problems. First, although
most union strategists voiced support for
grassroots organizing, few unions fully
implemented the rank-and-file union-
building tactics central to the new
model. Radical organizational change is
difficult, and it was particularly hard to
win support for the wholesale shift of
resources needed to fund grassroots
organizing on a scale sufficient to coun-
teract the economic and political forces
that were contributing to union decline.
Second, employers proved adept at ex-
ploiting the weaknesses in (and lax en-
forcement of) the NLRB union repre-
sentation process, and increased the
intensity and sophistication of their
avoidance efforts. This increased the cost
of organizing and added to the financial bur-
den on unions as they attempted to maintain
campaign activism throughout prolonged or-
ganizing fights.
As a strategist from a union that organized
under the NLRB in the 1990s describes the
current situation, “Now we only use the NLRB
when the unit is small, in a single location, and
the shop is on fire.” Throughout the labor move-
ment, frustration with the NLRB has given birth
to a modified approach that has evolved and
spread over the past ten years. Employer neu-
trality agreements have been around in one
form or another for decades; for example, con-
struction unions have used top-down organiz-
ing to secure work for members based on union
agreements with employers, and the United Au-
tomobile Workers (UAW) and the United Food
and Commercial Workers (UFCW) have ne-
gotiated accretion agreements with unionized
The Southwestern Bell
[neutrality] agreement
has been particularly
successful, with the
Communication Workers
adding nearly 40,000
members at the company’s
Cingular Wireless division
over the past ten years.
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firms that provide for membership growth as
new facilities are opened. Some unions have
also experimented with neutrality agreements
as an adjunct to grassroots organizing since the
1980s (see for example Krump, 1991; Hurd and
Rouse, 1990). By the late 1990s, several unions
actively engaged in bargaining to organize as
part of a national strategy. The Communica-
tions Workers of America (CWA) openly ad-
vocated this approach, negotiating neutrality
clauses with Southwestern Bell (SBC) and
AT&T (Benz, 2002). The SBC agreement has
been particularly successful, with the CWA
adding nearly 40,000 members at the company’s
Cingular Wireless division over the past ten
years (Acuff, 2007).
Other unions—most visibly SEIU, UNITE,
and HERE, but also UAW and the United Steel-
workers of America—have utilized corporate
campaign techniques from the start of specific
organizing initiatives. Their greatest successes
have come when the leverage afforded by cor-
porate campaigns made it possible to secure
both employer neutrality and card check in
order to skip the NLRB election process alto-
gether. By 2001, the AFL-CIO (which had been
promoting grassroots organizing and a
shift of resources since John Sweeney’s
election as president in 1995) began
“pushing affiliates to avoid the NLRB
process when and where possible” (Acuff,
2007). Expanding use and growing con-
sensus established neutrality and card
check as the new organizing paradigm for
the U.S. labor movement (Moberg, 2006),
and today the NLRB has been displaced
as “most new members come in through alter-
native approaches” (Acuff, 2007). The perspec-
tive of Teamsters organizing director Jeff
Farmer is typical: “In our national organizing
strategy, neutrality with card check is always
the goal” (Farmer, 2007).
NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS
AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS
THERE ARE TWO BROAD CATEGORIES OF NEUTRAL-ity agreements: those that are the product
of collective bargaining and those that are ne-
gotiated as stand-alone agreements with no
connection to existing collective bargaining
relationships. The stand-alone agreements
are usually secured by unions through the ap-
plication of corporate campaign pressures, as
has been the practice in the SEIU’s Justice for
Janitors initiative (Baird, 2007). Bargaining
to organize may also rely on comprehensive
pressure tactics, as was the case in the HWR
campaign. Alternatively, neutrality may be
secured at the bargaining table as a product
of efforts to develop labor-management part-
nerships, as exemplified by the CWA’s agree-
ment with SBC.
Based on mixed experience with the effec-
tiveness of neutrality agreements, unions have,
in the past ten years, refined their expectations
of what such agreements should include. Typi-
cally, the employer consents to limits on coer-
cive activities such as one-on-one sessions with
employees and captive-audience meetings. The
Although neutrality has
become the standard for
private sector organizing,
not all agreements are
effective.
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most effective agreements not only limit nega-
tive communications from employers, but also
specify that employees will be notified in writ-
ing that the employer will remain neutral. The
union is usually provided with an accurate list
of workers in the unit and granted some de-
gree of access to the worksite. The employer
accepts either card check certification or a
timely election conducted by a mutually ac-
cepted neutral party. Stand-alone neutrality
agreements that accept the standard NLRB con-
tested election framework (technically referred
to as stipulated elections) have not been par-
ticularly effective and are now avoided. How-
ever, in a relatively recent development, the
parties may accept a consent election conducted
by the NLRB, as is the practice pursued by
SEIU’s health care division. A final common
provision is for arbitration of all disputes un-
der the agreement (Scott, 2004; Eaton and
Kriesky, 2001).
Although neutrality has become the stan-
dard for private sector organizing, not all agree-
ments are effective. The CWA’s apparent vic-
tory in securing neutrality in Verizon’s wire-
less division has become instead the source of
great acrimony in the form of open resistance
from management. The company proved adept
at exploiting weaknesses in the contract lan-
guage, continued to resist organizing, and pre-
vailed in several key grievance cases (Patrician
and Raab, 2007).
Even in cases where national commitment
is secured from an employer, unions often en-
counter resistance in the workplace from su-
pervisors, who either have not been ad-
equately briefed on the agreement or who
become enforcers of the company’s con-
tinued efforts to resist unionization. Most
unions now seek  neutrality language that
is “strict and straightforward” (Baird,
2007). As described by a lawyer experi-
enced in negotiating and enforcing neu-
trality agreements, “There is really no
neutrality; these are play nice arrange-
ments. There is more access but these usually
are nasty little campaigns.” Even with neutral-
ity, then, union strategists agree that unions
must conduct thorough organizing with effec-
tive targeting, assessment, and some degree of
grassroots mobilization.
NEUTRALITY, THE EMPLOYEE
FREE CHOICE ACT, AND
FUTURE PROSPECTS
GIVEN THE ACCUMULATING EVIDENCE OF SUCCESSassociated with neutrality agreements and
card check, it is not surprising that labor’s top
political priority is the Employee Free Choice
Act (EFCA). As readers of New Labor Forum
are undoubtedly aware, the EFCA would aug-
ment the NLRB certification process with new
limits on employer conduct parallel to those in
most neutrality agreements, formalize the pro-
cess for securing card check certification, and
provide for arbitration of first contracts. Al-
though the EFCA failed to pass Congress in
2007 and is unlikely to be enacted without a
change in the White House and in the compo-
Expectations that the
EFCA will deliver unions
from organizing
purgatory may prove to be
overly optimistic.
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sition of the Senate, it is appropriate to specu-
late on the likely impact of the proposed legis-
lation in light of unions’ experiences with vol-
untarily negotiated neutrality agreements.
There is a widespread presumption among
national labor leaders that enactment of the
EFCA would cause a reversal in unions’ pri-
vate sector fortunes. Even a cursory review of
the Canadian experience under provincial laws
that parallel the EFCA indicates that it is wise
to be cautious. It is true that private sector union
density in Canada stands at 17 percent, more
than double the U.S. share of 7.4 percent. How-
ever, union density is declining at a similar rate
in both countries: there has been a 21 percent
relative decline over the past ten years in
Canada, compared to a 26 percent relative de-
cline in the United States. As Canadian labor
relations scholar Roy Adams points out, be-
cause of continued employer resistance “union
density and bargaining coverage are falling even
in such provinces as Saskatchewan and Que-
bec that have card-check and first-contract ar-
bitration clauses in effect” (Adams, 2006).
Adams concludes that the net impact of the
EFCA would be minimal because employer
opposition would undoubtedly continue, albeit
in an altered form under the new law.
Based on the Canadian experience, then,
expectations that the EFCA will deliver unions
from organizing purgatory may prove to be
overly optimistic. This is really no surprise.
Recall that in the 1990s there were many union
strategists and analysts (including this author)
who believed that the grassroots, union-build-
ing model of organizing could overcome the
disadvantages of the NLRB representation
process. Just as intensifying employer opposi-
tion undermined the effectiveness of grass-
roots organizing, it seems likely that continu-
ing employer antagonism will limit the ability
of unions to take full advantage of legislated
neutrality.
As Orrin Baird of SEIU observes, “Even
with the EFCA we will continue doing what we
are doing. We will have to whip employers, get
employers to accept the union” (Baird, 2007).
A national staff member from another union
concurs, noting that “even in Canada where the
law is better we use corporate campaigns in
organizing.” American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees Organizing
Director Jim Schmitz adds the following cau-
tion: “I hope [the EFCA] doesn’t lead to less
disciplined organizing” (Schmitz, 2007). In
short, even with the EFCA, unions will need to
build on the experiences of effective bargain-
ing to organize.
ARE NEUTRALITY
AGREEMENTS GOOD FOR
WORKERS AND UNIONS?
EVEN THOUGH THERE IS BROAD SUPPORT FOR THEEFCA, ironically there is also an undercur-
rent of criticism aimed at unions with aggres-
sive neutrality strategies that are perceived as
too top-down in their approach. There is no
denying that most neutrality agreements are
achieved through top-down methods; the bar-
gaining, corporate campaigns, and political ini-
tiatives associated with neutrality are typically
controlled by national union leaders and staff.
In a clear example of this, a national union or-
ganizer recently described to the author a ma-
jor organizing initiative that is scheduled for
kickoff during late 2007 or early 2008. Over
a year of preparation has been completed for
this multiunion corporate campaign, but as of
the end of September 2007 there had been no
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contact at all with the workers who would be
targeted.
Although there are top-down aspects of
almost every neutrality agreement, SEIU has
been subjected to particular scrutiny and criti-
cism. Pacts with nursing home chains in Cali-
fornia and Washington have been especially
controversial. In both cases, the union agreed
to push for increased funding that would ben-
efit nursing homes, and in return was guaran-
teed neutrality in some of the facilities owned
by the chains. Criticism of the agreements
within SEIU spilled over into public debate with
articles in the San Francisco Weekly and the
Seattle Times (Smith, 2007; and Thomas 2007).
Critics of SEIU within the labor movement
were quick to latch onto the articles and dis-
tributed them widely.
The negative press coverage may be irrel-
evant, especially the San Francisco Weekly ar-
ticle, given that paper’s libertarian editorial ten-
dencies (Shaw, 2007). But both articles basically
echo criticism within the union, and the ques-
tions raised by experienced local leaders and
organizers are not so easily dismissed. SEIU’s
United Healthcare Workers West (UHW) ques-
tioned two key aspects of the deal with the Cali-
fornia nursing homes in an internal report
(2007). First, UHW criticized the template con-
tract that served as the basis for bargaining in
all new units, decrying especially the
failure to involve new members in de-
cisions about negotiating priorities.
Second, UHW questioned the terms
of the arrangement under which nurs-
ing home chains could specify which
properties could be organized; only
thirty-five of the nursing home chains’
201 previously nonunion facilities
achieved representation during the
three-year life of the pact. UHW ar-
gued that any future agreement should
contribute more significantly to the
long-term goal of organizing 100 per-
cent of California’s nursing homes.
In light of the controversy, SEIU
ended its California nursing homes partnership
on May 31, 2007 (Brenner, 2007). But similar
agreements are in effect in other states, so the
internal debate continues. Former SEIU execu-
tive board member (and long-time president
of SEIU 1199 Connecticut) Jerome Brown
raises concerns about the Washington agree-
ment that parallel those voiced by UHW. He
warns that neutrality agreements negotiated as
part of broader political partnerships with em-
ployers could create “the very antithesis of true
rank-and-file unionism” (Thomas, 2007).
Brown expresses special doubts about the ten-
dency of these agreements to omit workers from
any involvement in organizing and bargaining
decisions.
Although SEIU’s approach to neutrality has
stirred the most controversy, in many respects
Former SEIU executive
board member Gerome
Brown warns, “Neutrality
agreements negotiated as
part of broader political
partnerships with
employers could
undermine rank-and-file
unionism.”
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the practices of other unions are actually quite
similar. For example, the CWA partnership with
SBC/Cingular arguably goes beyond the Cali-
fornia nursing homes’ template contract, which
merely sets basic conditions in advance of ne-
gotiations. At Cingular, “As soon as you orga-
nize, you go right into the national agreement”
(Patrician and Raab, 2007). The neutrality
agreement specifies that new units will be cov-
ered under the national CWA-Cingular con-
tract as soon as a majority card check is con-
firmed.
Other union agreements mirror key pro-
visions of the SEIU accords. The UNITE-HERE
hotel contracts assure neutrality only at speci-
fied properties, and the UAW deal with
Daimler-Chrysler only applied to some of the
company’s U.S.-owned factories. The parallel
with the limited applicability of SEIU’s nursing
home neutrality in California and Washington
is obvious.
There certainly are legitimate concerns
about whether we can rebuild the labor move-
ment without engaging workers in struggle.
One answer to this dilemma is to embrace an
approach that combines neutrality with key el-
ements of the grassroots, union-building
model. As described by Kan Zinn of the
AFL-CIO, “We don’t believe in negotiat-
ing an alternative process in advance of
organizing. . . . We stress the involvement
of the workers in the campaign to get
neutrality” (Zinn, 2007).
Although the emphasis and style of
organizing may vary, many unions do
involve current members in the fight for
neutrality. At SBC, the CWA engaged in “sev-
eral years of grassroots action around card
check” to secure member support before reach-
ing agreement with the company (Patrician and
Rabb, 2007). Similarly, UNITE-HERE educated
local leaders and activists in advance of 2006
hotel negotiations about the need for neutral-
ity, then relied extensively on volunteer orga-
nizers from established locals once neutrality
agreements were secured. Including workers
from the targeted units in the fight for neutral-
ity appears to be far less common, and in the
event that EFCA is enacted the need for this
would effectively disappear.
But, is it necessary to engage workers in
the campaign for neutrality, or is it sufficient
to win their signatures or votes for represen-
tation? The position on this question associ-
ated with Change to Win unions is that the
emphasis should be on securing recognition,
thereby increasing density in key markets,
which will build workers’ power and the lever-
age to improve wages, benefits, working con-
ditions, and voice.
Ultimately, both the decision to pursue
neutrality and the type of agreement negot-
iated will be determined by some combination
of strategic considerations, economic and po-
litical leverage, and internal union dynamics.
There will always be trade-offs, and no two situ-
ations are likely to be identical. To some ex-
tent, every union will have to decide be-tween
the short-term interests of current members
and the long-term objective of growth. Every
union will also have to weigh the advantages of
When unions win
employer neutrality, they
enhance the potential for
organizing success.
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engaging workers in a bottom-up struggle to
achieve recognition, against the potential gains
offered by opportunities to use top-down ap-
proaches to achieve neutrality.
Whatever the tactical decisions of indi-
vidual unions in specific campaigns, none of
the recent discourse around deficiencies in par-
ticular agreements alters the core reality—when
unions win employer neutrality, they enhance
the potential for organizing success. When it
makes strategic sense to use grassroots orga-
nizing as a component of the campaign for neu-
trality, it is likely that the new local will be in a
stronger position to defend workers on the job.
When it is expeditious to rely solely on top-
down methods to more quickly secure neutral-
ity and first contracts, the unions will still need
to attend to the challenge of mobilizing work-
ers so that representation does not simply be-
come a transitory empty shell. No matter how
unions decide to proceed, it is clear that en-
forceable employer neutrality will continue to
be a central component of labor’s organizing
strategy.
THE CONTINUING QUEST FOR
TRUE ORGANIZING
NEUTRALITY
IF POLITICAL FORTUNES PAVE THE WAY FOR ENACT-ment of the EFCA, this indeed would have
some potential to benefit labor by establishing
a less contentious legal framework. But what-
ever happens to the law, private sector density
will rebound only when unions develop suffi-
cient leverage to win collective bargaining rights
from reluctant employers. UNITE-HERE’s
Hotel Workers Rising Campaign and CWA’s
card check organizing at Cingular provide high
visibility examples that need to be replicated
broadly throughout the labor movement. They
represent remarkable accomplishments in the
context of an extremely unfriendly NLRB and
its interpretation of an already weak set of la-
bor laws. Interunion squabbling and finger-
pointing aside, all of the ongoing initiatives
aimed at securing enforceable employer neu-
trality are contributing to labor’s efforts to dis-
cover a path to growth.
Where unions succeed in securing effec-
tive neutrality, organizers will be able to turn
their attention to building enthusiasm for union
representation among workers—a less complex
challenge than under the standard NLRB
framework because employer resistance is lim-
ited. There is no silver bullet, and no substitute
for strategic sophistication in union organiz-
ing programs. The unions that rise to the chal-
lenge of implementing organizational change,
exploiting synergies between bargaining and
organizing, and building the capacity to secure
enforceable neutrality agreements will be in the
best position to thrive.  ?
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